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y title is “The Emergence of 
the American Constitutional 
Law Tradition,” and what I 
want us to think about today 
is the process by which American con-
stitutional law came to be what it is in 
2018. Now that’s a long, complicated 
story, and all I can do is give you a few 
outtakes from what is a much broader 
book project. I’m going to summarize 
some specific stories from the overall 
narrative, and hope to give you a sense 
of how the big story hangs together. 
Before I begin, however, I want to 
say something about the word “tra-
dition.” By tradition we often mean 
some practice that a particular group 
or community engages in over time. In 
my maternal grandparents’ family, it is 
a tradition to eat celery stalks stuffed 
with homemade pimento cheese on 
Thanksgiving. I don’t know when the 
Carters began doing so — but it’s some-
thing we do: If the people you’re dining 
with on Thanksgiving don’t have a 
plate full of celery and pimento cheese, 
they’re probably not Carters. Repeating 
this little tradition year after year is an 
identifying mark of my family. 
Intellectual traditions differ in the 
way they cohere over time. As the 
great philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre 
said years ago, a tradition of rational 
inquiry does not maintain its continu-
ity through the simple repetition of 
what has been thought and said in the 
past. What gives life to such a tradi-
tion is not so much agreement about 
answers as it is agreement about 
questions. In MacIntyre’s words, an 
intellectual “tradition is an argu-
ment extended through time in which 
[even its] fundamental agreements 
are defined and redefined . . . [through] 
conflict.”1 An intellectual tradition, 
unless it goes dead, is a continuity of 
conflict, and debate and disagreement 
are its lifeblood. The emergence of the 
American constitutional law tradition, 
then, is the story of an ongoing debate, 
an endless argument over, among 
other things, what constitutional law 
is about. 
One other thing: Let me tell you up 
front my hidden agenda. First, I want 
you to be optimistic and also anxious 
about the health of our constitutional 
law tradition. We’re living in a time 
of deep constitutional division, but 
severe disagreement is nothing new, 
and raucous debate is a sign of health, 
not decay. But at the same time, the 
tradition will not maintain itself: It 
depends on our commitment to carry 
on our debates in good faith, to recog-
nize whenever possible the good faith 
of those with whom we disagree, and 
to resist the perennial temptation to 
convert constitutional law into a mere 
tool of ideological warfare. And sec-
ond? I hope to persuade some of you 
that the study of our constitutional 
law’s past for its own sake is endlessly 
fascinating, quite apart from any value 
it may have in present-day debates. 
Now, let me take you back to the 
very beginning of the American 
constitutional law tradition. It’s 
somewhat artificial to choose a spe-
cific year, and even more a specific day, 
as the beginning of any great intellec-
tual tradition: They don’t spring fully 
formed from the forehead of Zeus; 
they take shape gradually. That said, 
I feel confident that few lawyers in 
this room will question the date I’ve 
chosen to begin my story. After all, an 
obvious starting point for our tradi-
tion is Feb. 7, 1292. 
Perhaps there’s someone here who’s 
not a lawyer, and I should say a bit about 
the significance of Feb. 7, 1292. It was 
on that day that King Edward I commis-
sioned William de Bereford as a judge 
on the Court of Common Pleas, thus u
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setting in motion the intellectual and 
institutional developments that even-
tually lead to American constitutional 
law in 2018.2 Bereford himself is a 
fascinating character: He came from a 
modest family in the English midlands, 
and he declined to pursue a career 
in the church or in the king’s house-
hold, the only options for a brainy and 
ambitious young man without means. 
Instead, Bereford somehow managed 
to worm his way into the small group 
of non-clerics who in the 1270s and ’80s 
were coalescing as full-time advocates 
in the Court of Common Pleas. By the 
late 1280s, Bereford was what a mod-
ern scholar called “the Common Bench 
specialist par excellence,” and the king 
himself had retained Bereford in sev-
eral cases.3 Appointing this familiar, 
skilled, and no doubt reliable legal 
henchman to the court likely seemed 
a safe choice to Edward and his advi-
sors, but putting Bereford on the bench 
would have repercussions the king 
could never have guessed. 
For one thing, Bereford was one 
of the first royal judges chosen for 
his professional skills and accom-
plishments in the law. Before him, 
appointment to a royal court almost 
always went to a senior government 
bureaucrat, often a churchman: Such 
judges came to the bench with little 
knowledge of legal procedure and no 
personal interest in expanding the role 
of the courts in government. Bereford 
was a judge of a different ilk: He owed 
his elevation to his mastery of the law, 
and his interests and his judgments 
were shaped by professional pride and 
expertise. His appointment was a suc-
cessful experiment. After him, almost 
all royal judges had backgrounds sim-
ilar to his, and the judiciary quickly 
became the preserve of an autono-
mous profession, rather than a branch 
of the church or the bureaucracy.4 
Perhaps this would not have mat-
tered so much if William de Bereford 
had been a different character or his 
appointment had occurred in a differ-
ent era, but, at times, history is shaped 
by the accidental convergence of the 
personal and the societal. Bereford was 
a self-confident and forceful individual, 
politically shrewd and utterly con-
vinced that it was lawyers who ought 
to say what the law is. He was long-
lived as well, and served for almost 34 
years, half of the time as chief justice. 
By the time he died, no common law 
judge or advocate knew any vision of 
law but Bereford’s.
Of equal importance, Bereford was 
given the opportunity to shape bench 
and bar in a time of great legal fer-
ment. King Edward I was later named 
the English Justinian because it was in 
his reign, and that of his son Edward II, 
that the common law of the realm was 
overhauled root and branch and began 
to assume its developed medieval 
and early modern form.5 For the first 
Edward’s first 20 years, legal reform 
was centered in the high Court of 
Parliament. The dominant judicial body 
was the Court of King’s Bench, and 
the clerks in the royal Chancery held 
a tight grip on what cases the royal 
courts could and could not hear. By the 
time Chief Justice Bereford died, all of 
this was in the process of transfor-
mation: The initiative for legal change 
now lay in the Court of Common Pleas, 
the authority of King’s Bench to review 
Common Pleas decisions was largely a 
dead letter, and Bereford had wrested 
effective control over his court’s juris-
diction from Chancery. Bereford was, 
in short, the first great practitioner of 
what later became a legal maxim, “It is 
the duty of a good judge to expand his 
jurisdiction.”6 
But to what end, you ask? What 
was Chief Justice Bereford trying to 
accomplish in expanding his court’s 
authority? The Yearbooks — those mar-
velous but often perplexing records of 
legal argument in the medieval courts 
that begin their regular appearance 
under Bereford — give us no clear 
answer, though they give many exam-
ples of his wit and his quick temper. 
But if you examine his patterns of 
commentary and judgment, you begin 
to see overarching themes. Let me give 
you a couple of examples. 
The law of real property before 
Bereford was largely a description 
of the personal, political, and con-
stitutional relationships among the 
Crown, its great noble vassals, their 
lesser tenants, and so on. By Bereford’s 
death, what were originally personal 
duties owed between specific indi-
viduals were well on their way to 
becoming obligations running with 
the land itself, and ownership was 
y Bereford’s 
death, what 
were originally 
personal duties 
owed between 
specific individuals 
were well on their 
way to becoming 
obligations running 
with the land itself, 
and ownership 
was increasingly 
determined by legal 
rules and the market 
rather than heredity. 
This was no accident. 
B
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increasingly determined by legal rules 
and the market rather than heredi-
ty.7 This was no accident: As Bereford 
said in a 1320 case enforcing a bargain 
concerning land, the decision rested in 
part on the existence of a quid pro quo, 
“there [was here] one thing in return 
for another, for which principle we 
have great regard.”8 
Again, Bereford usually insisted that 
litigants and their lawyers turn square 
corners in satisfying the law’s tech-
nical requirements. But he detested 
attempts to use legal technicalities 
to achieve unfair advantage. In a 1310 
case, Bereford exploded when a defen-
dant invoked a trivial pleading error in 
order to avoid a clear duty to pay half 
the plaintiff’s loss: “Reason requires 
that you [pay], and the law is founded 
on reason, and good faith demands it. 
You want to have the eggs and the half 
penny too.”9 (By the way, according to 
one historian, a half penny would buy a 
dozen eggs about this time.10)
By and large, the changes Bereford 
and his colleagues effected in the law 
are ones most of us would think desir-
able. But Bereford’s central importance 
for our story lies elsewhere, in the style 
of judicial personality he bequeathed 
the common law, and ultimately 
American constitutional law.
Our tradition is not the product 
of anonymous bureaucrats, but the 
creation in large measure of strong-
minded and strong-willed judges 
prepared to use their creativity to 
reshape the law. Think of the truly 
influential constitutional judges in 
U.S. history from John Marshall and 
Joseph Story to William Brennan and 
William Rehnquist. They were all heirs 
of William de Bereford in their willing-
ness to exercise power. We can say of 
each what Justice Benjamin Cardozo 
wrote about Chief Justice Marshall: 
He “gave to the Constitution . . . the 
impress of his own mind . . . [so that] 
our constitutional law is what it is, 
because he moulded it . . . in the fire of 
his own intense convictions.”11
And thereon hangs the other side of 
Chief Justice Bereford’s legacy to us. 
That he, and his American heirs, have 
acted out of intense conviction, I have 
no doubt. But was it right for him, or 
for them, to do so? What is and what 
should be the relationship between the 
judge’s personal convictions and the 
“law” supposedly being expounded? 
Bereford upended many of England’s 
previous constitutional arrangements, 
and he often did so by strained read-
ings of Parliament’s acts, by ignoring 
common law rules that were in his way, 
and by finding means to circumvent the 
limitations on his court’s authority. All 
of this should sound familiar: American 
constitutional law has been deeply 
shaped by the exercise of judicial power 
in the Bereford style by judges cast in 
the Bereford mold . . . and one of our 
central debates has been over how to 
ensure that the exercise of such power 
by such judges is legitimate. 
This problem of legitimacy is not 
a modern or American discovery. 
Eighteen years after Bereford died, 
the Court of Common Pleas heard a 
case, Flaundres v. Rychman, in which 
the plaintiff’s lawyer invoked a 
Bereford decision. When one of the 
judges sounded doubtful, the lawyer 
insisted. “I think you will do as others 
have done in the same case, or else we 
do not know what the law is.” Justice 
Roger Hillary, the first known Legal 
Realist, answered: “[Law] is the will of 
the Justices.” To which Chief Justice 
John Stonor immediately replied — 
and I will quote the law French since I 
took a course in that bizarre language 
years ago and seldom get to mispro-
nounce it: “Nanyl, ley est resoun.” 
“Nonsense! [it’s an emphatic negative], 
law is reason.”12
 Resoun in law French is sometimes 
best translated by a phrase like “what 
makes sense” or “what is in fact truly 
just,” and Stonor was, I think, tak-
ing a step beyond Bereford’s dislike 
for the use of technicalities employed 
to achieve unjust ends. Over the next 
three centuries, this idea that law is 
reason was fleshed out, and it was 
another chief justice of Common Pleas, 
Sir Edward Coke, who gave the equa-
tion its canonical formulation.13 In 
November 1608, King James I convened 
a meeting at Westminster of judges and 
other high officials: James was unhappy 
about the Common Pleas interfering 
with the work of commissions exercis-
ing the king’s personal prerogative and 
wanted to rein Coke in.14 In the course 
of the discussion, James commented 
that if law is reason, then he himself 
— being a reasonable and learned king 
— was perfectly competent to make 
legal decisions or delegate them to his 
political councilors. Coke tried to find a 
polite way to say no: 
[T]rue it is that God has endowed 
your Majesty with excellent Science 
and great endowments of nature, 
but your Majesty is not learned 
in the Lawes of your Realme of 
England, and causes which concern 
the life, or inheritance, or goods 
of your Subjects . . . are not to be 
decided by naturall reasoning but 
by the artificiall reason and judg-
ment of Law . . . which requires long 
study and experience.
The authority of the courts over 
political actors, in other words, stems 
from the judges’ intellectual immersion 
in the tradition of legal thought. Even 
when the law requires judges to give 
effect to an act of Parliament or of the 
monarch, such political acts must enter 
the domain of law governed by the u
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judges’ reasoned judgment before they 
can rightly touch the “life or inheri-
tance or goods” of the individual. It’s 
a bold and indeed breathtaking claim 
about the authority of legal reason, and 
the scope of judicial authority, and it is 
one that underlies virtually all of mod-
ern American constitutional law.
King James was not amused. Indeed, 
he was enraged by what he called “trea-
son,” and Coke only barely escaped a 
cell in the Tower of London. But the 
episode had no effect on Coke’s behav-
ior as a judge, and Anglo-American 
lawyers have long cited it as an import-
ant milestone in the history of the rule 
of law: For all the king’s bluster, it was 
Coke and the common law that had the 
last laugh. It’s a great tale, and more or 
less true. But of equal importance for 
our story is what the king actually said. 
James didn’t simply lose his temper: 
He also delivered a shrewd counter to 
Coke’s argument.
If the judges interprete the lawes 
themselves, and suffer none else 
to interprete, then they may easily 
make of the laws shipmens hose.15
I don’t know why the king thought of 
sailors’ socks, but his point is clear: If, 
as Coke claimed, it is the province and 
duty of the courts alone to say what the 
law is, there is no institutional check 
on the judges. Neither legal texts, 
which clever construction can leave as 
flexible as a stocking, nor the forms of 
legal reason, which the courts them-
selves define, can prevent a supremacy 
not of law, but of lawyers — and, above 
all, judges. 
The distinguished legal historian 
William Holdsworth once wrote that 
the U.S. Supreme Court embodies 
“Coke’s ideal of the supremacy of the 
law.”16 Precisely because that is true, 
the American constitutional law tra-
dition continues to wrestle with King 
James’s objection: that to legitimate 
judicial decision by judicial reasoning is 
viciously circular, and that a court act-
ing on Coke’s ideal is free to assume an 
illegitimate political role at will.
Now let me bring you forward 
not quite two centuries and across 
the Atlantic to Washington, D.C. 
It is the winter of 1800–1801, and the 
infant United States is in a constitu-
tional crisis, a crisis of constitutional 
politics rather than constitutional law. 
It’s become clear that both the House 
and the Senate in the next federal 
Congress will have Republican major-
ities, and that the current president, 
Federalist John Adams, will not keep 
his office barring some sort of political 
coup d’etat. It’s quite unclear who will 
become president, since the pre-12th 
Amendment electoral college arrange-
ments have produced a tie between 
two Republicans. And in the meantime 
and up to the beginning of March, the 
old Federalist-controlled Congress is 
sitting, Adams is still president, and 
the defeated Federalists have one last 
window of opportunity to wield power.
The story by which the crisis was 
surmounted and Jefferson became 
president is no doubt familiar.17 I 
want us to focus instead on a different 
aspect of that winter’s events. On Dec. 
22, 1800, a Republican congressman, 
Thomas Davis, gave a speech in which 
he smugly warned his Federalist col-
leagues that political time was running 
out on them: “The sun of Federalism is 
nearly set — not three months, and it 
sets forever.”18 Davis’s image appar-
ently hit a nerve, and the Federalists 
repeatedly brought it up to rebut it. 
But the rhetorical argument over the 
twilight of Federalism took a new turn 
the following month, as the House 
debated a bill to re-authorize the 
Sedition Act of 1798. 
On Jan. 21, Federalist Jonas Platt 
reminded the House of Davis’s sunset 
imagery and “confessed that he viewed 
with horror the awful night that would 
follow.”19 Platt quickly made it clear 
that he and other Federalists dreaded 
the Republican triumph not only for 
its immediate political ramifications, 
but also for what it implied about 
the future of the Constitution itself. 
Congress was the central locus for fed-
eral constitutional debate at first, and, 
over the previous 12 years, the emer-
gence of Federalists and Republicans as 
partisan political factions in Congress 
was paralleled by the emergence of 
two distinct approaches to constitu-
tional argument. Republicans generally 
insisted on construing the Constitution 
with painstaking adherence to its pre-
cise wording and literal meaning. 
f, as Coke 
claimed, it is 
the province 
and duty of the courts 
alone to say what 
the law is, there is no 
institutional check on 
the judges. Neither 
legal texts, which 
clever construction 
can leave as flexible 
as a stocking, nor the 
forms of legal reason, 
which the courts 
themselves define, 
can prevent a 
supremacy not of 
law, but of lawyers — 
and, above all, judges. 
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James Madison’s great speech against 
the national bank bill in February 1791 
offered a dense list of “rules” of inter-
pretation emphasizing the duty to 
obey “the natural and obvious force of 
the terms and the context” of particu-
lar constitutional provisions.20 Other 
Republicans took even more strin-
gent views: As Stevens Mason put it 
in a later debate, “[n]ot only sentences, 
but words, and even [punctuation] 
points elucidate its meaning,” and the 
elucidation of the text’s meaning is 
constitutional law.21 
In contrast, the Federalists, in that 
long first decade, regularly denounced 
Republican textualism as a betrayal 
of the written Constitution. Rising to 
answer Madison’s attack on the bank 
bill, the great Federalist Fisher Ames 
mocked Madison’s arguments:
I never suspected that the objec-
tions I have heard stated had 
existence; I consider them as 
discoveries [that] the acute pen-
etration of that gentleman [has] 
brought . . . to light.
Sarcasm to one side, according to 
Ames, Madison’s textualism was a 
radical mistake. Contrary to Madison, 
dogmatic “rules” about how to inter-
pret the Constitution were quite 
incapable of ensuring correct consti-
tutional answers. Madison’s attempts 
to parse its words “will be found 
as obscure [as the arguments he] 
condemn[s]; they only set up one con-
struction against another.”22
For Ames, and for the Federalists 
generally, fidelity to the Constitution 
lay in adherence to the Constitution’s 
purposes rather than its precise 
wording. “That construction may be 
maintained to be a safe one which pro-
motes the good of the society, and the 
ends for which the Government was 
adopted.”23 As someone else put it, “the 
boundaries of the Constitution cannot 
be laid down with mathematical preci-
sion, by the square and compass. They 
must be ascertained by . . . the exercise 
of discretion.”24 Congressman Platt 
was mourning not just a defeat on the 
level of power and policy, but a deeper 
tragedy: the Constitution’s transfor-
mation from a coherent instrument of 
governance into a grab bag of separate 
clauses for lawyers to quibble over. 
It’s important to understand what 
was actually at stake in the winter of 
1800 and 1801. There was of course a 
political and partisan dimension to the 
debate over constitutional method: 
Federalist discretion conveniently 
legitimated their legislative program, 
while Republican textualism happily 
vindicated their general opposition to 
Federalist legislation. But the debate 
over constitutional method was not 
simply a matter of political expe-
dience. It also reflected principled 
concerns, on the part of both factions, 
about the capacity of Lord Coke’s “arti-
ficiall Reason and judgment of Law” 
to reach legitimate decisions under 
the Constitution. Republicans were 
echoing King James’s fear that profes-
sional legal reason is the tool by which 
legal insiders can circumvent writ-
ten limits on their power. Federalists, 
for their part, thought that most con-
stitutional difficulties “arise from a 
narrow, technical, lawyer-like view 
of the Constitution” at odds with “the 
great national purposes for which the 
Constitution was adopted.”25 
If our constitutional law tradition 
had followed either set of fears, in 2018 
it might not really be a legal tradition at 
all. Strict textualism can produce ram-
pant disregard for the too-strict textual 
limits on power: As one congressman 
said, the text “will be habitually broken 
whenever the pressure of events shall 
seem to require.”26 A thorough-go-
ing emphasis on purpose, on the other 
hand, tends to reduce constitutional 
questions to straightforward ques-
tions of policy: The Constitution, as 
a senator once asserted, “is one eter- 
nal now” and authorizes whatever 
seems “necessary and proper” to do 
“this day.”27
Our tradition went neither of these 
paths, and one of the reasons goes 
back to that fateful winter. The day 
before Congressman Platt bemoaned 
the sunset of Federalism, President 
Adams nominated his secretary of 
state, John Marshall, to be chief justice. 
The Federalist majority in the Senate 
made no public objection, but, behind 
closed doors, many Federalist leaders 
were disappointed. Marshall’s politi-
cal heart was in the right place, most of 
them conceded, but constitutionally he 
was all too similar to his cousin Thomas 
Jefferson, another nit-picking Southern 
lawyer. After meeting Marshall, Oliver 
Wolcott wrote Ames that 
Marshall . . . is doubtless a man 
of virtue . . . but he will think too 
much of the State of Virginia, and 
is too much disposed to govern 
the world according to rules of 
logic; he will read and expound the 
Constitution as if it were a penal 
statute, and will sometimes be 
embarrassed with doubts of which 
his friends will not perceive the 
importance.
Ames was less indulgent: “False 
Federalists or such as act wrong from 
false fears should be dealt hardly with, 
if I were Jupiter the Thunderer.”28 But 
he kept quiet too, and Marshall was 
quickly confirmed. 
Ames, who died in 1808, doubt-
less went to his grave thinking he had 
been right about Marshall. In a series 
of early, mostly forgotten decisions — I 
have in mind such headliners as Clarke 
v. Bazadone and Hepburn v. Ellzey29 — 
Marshall led the Court in reaching u
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constitutional decisions by carefully 
textual means, but, as time passed, it 
became clear that Marshall was no 
Jefferson, and no Fisher Ames either. 
He and his allies stood, rather, in the 
tradition of Lord Coke and sought to 
answer constitutional questions by 
applying what Marshall called “that 
great paramount law of reason, which 
pervades and regulates all human sys-
tems,” while observing the American 
principle that the written Constitution 
is “a rule for the government of 
courts, as well as of the legislature.”30 
Constitutional law is reason, reason 
operating to give reasonable effect to 
the written supreme law. The underly-
ing intellectual structure of American 
constitutional law in 2018 descends 
in lineal succession from the com-
mon law of Chief Justice Coke in no 
small measure because Chief Justice 
Marshall made it so. And, as a conse-
quence, our tradition is also a debate 
over the extent to which the Supreme 
Court has been guilty of the sins about 
which King James warned us.
 
My last story begins a few years 
before the winter of 1800 and 1801, 
in 1793 on the ground floor of the 
Philadelphia City Hall, where the 
Supreme Court of the United States is 
announcing its first substantive deci-
sion, Chisholm v. Georgia.31 By a four to 
one vote, the justices have concluded 
that the Court has original jurisdiction 
over a contract action brought by a 
South Carolina citizen against the state 
of Georgia, but our concern today is not 
with the decision itself; instead, I want 
us to think about a single line in Chief 
Justice John Jay’s seriatim opinion. 
In Jay’s view, the only important 
objection to the Court’s jurisdiction 
lay in the idea that Georgia as a sover-
eign enjoyed immunity from suit, and 
Jay thought the answer to that objec-
tion obvious: The idea of sovereign 
immunity has no place in American 
constitutional law. As the term itself 
suggests, Jay explained, sovereign 
immunity stems from “feudal princi-
ples, [a political] system [that] considers 
the Prince as the sovereign, and the 
people as his subjects.” 
No such ideas obtain here; at 
the Revolution, the sovereignty 
devolved on the people; and they 
are truly the sovereigns of the 
country, but they are sovereigns 
without subjects . . . and have none 
to govern but themselves; the cit-
izens of America are equal . . . as 
joint tenants in the sovereignty. . . . 
[and t]he attention and attachment 
of the Constitution to the equal 
rights of the people are discernable 
in almost every sentence of it.32
Jay’s understanding of equality was 
not ours, and by “equal rights” he meant 
that every member of the community 
is equally entitled to the protection of 
the law, not that everyone’s rights are 
the same. But in one respect, Jay’s views 
do not differ from ours: As he had writ-
ten a few years before, he believed that 
“all our inhabitants of every colour 
and denomination [should] be free and 
equal.”33 And because he believed that, 
Jay had to recognize a glaring anomaly 
in his account of the American consti-
tutional order.  
I left out a phrase from the Chisholm 
passage I quoted; now let me restore 
the missing words. Americans, Chief 
Justice Jay asserted, “are truly the sov-
ereigns of the country, but they are 
sovereigns without subjects (unless 
the African slaves among us may be 
so called).” As Jay painfully recognized, 
the existence of human chattel slav-
ery in the United States contradicted 
what he believed to be the funda-
mental premise of the Republic: that, 
among its inhabitants, there can be 
no subjects, “for in this country there 
are none; [no one is] an inferior . . . for 
all [“our inhabitants”] are, as to civil 
rights, perfectly equal.”34 But no, not all 
Americans were free or equal, and Jay 
had no constitutional answer to that 
ultimate contradiction: In Chisholm, he 
simply acknowledged it. 
Later constitutional lawyers cut the 
Gordian knot. In 1806, Jackey Wright 
and her daughter and granddaugh-
ter brought a suit for their freedom in 
the Virginia Court of Chancery.35 The 
Wrights claimed that they could prove 
their direct descent from a Native 
American ancestor and thus could not 
be held as slaves under Virginia law. 
Based on the evidence, Chancellor 
George Wythe, a legendary figure in 
founding-era American law, ruled in 
their favor — and he gave a constitu-
tional basis for his decision as well. 
Article 1 of the Virginia Declaration 
of Rights states that “all men are by 
nature equally free and independent 
and have certain inherent rights,” 
including personal liberty. Under this 
article, Wythe concluded that “free-
dom is the birth right of every human 
being” in Virginia, and the burden of 
proof lay on a would-be slaveholder to 
prove with clear evidence his claim to 
hold another person in bondage.36
Chancellor Wythe’s constitutional 
holding left slavery legal on its face, 
but nonetheless threatened to top-
ple the institution one successful suit 
for freedom after another, and it is 
not surprising that the state court of 
appeals rejected his article 1 reason-
ing while affirming his judgment on 
the facts. One of the judges sitting on 
the appeal was St. George Tucker, who 
had serious anti-slavery credentials: 
Three years earlier, he had published a 
direct attack on the institution.37 But in 
Hudgins v. Wright, Tucker denied that 
slavery was inconsistent with Virginia 
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constitutional law, however poorly it 
fit with Virginia constitutional princi-
ple. According to Tucker, 
the first clause of the Bill of Rights 
. . . was meant to embrace the case 
of free citizens, or aliens only; and 
not by a side wind to overturn the 
rights of property, and give free-
dom to those very people [who] 
had no concern, agency or interest 
[in “the revolution”].38
Slaves, in other words, might be 
“people” but they were not part of our 
people, the people for whom American 
constitutions are made. In Jay’s terms, 
slaves are among us, but Tucker 
insisted, they are not of us. Tucker’s 
reasoning defused the revolutionary 
potential of constitutional language 
about liberty and equality and quickly 
became standard judicial fare; but 
Tucker’s was not the only possible 
answer to Jay’s dilemma.
Let’s now go to Raleigh: It’s December 
1829. The North Carolina Supreme 
Court has before it a case called State v. 
Mann.39 Mann shot a slave named Lydia 
whose services he had leased, and a jury 
convicted him of a “cruel and unwar-
rantable” battery. State law was clear 
that had he killed Lydia, Mann would 
have been criminally liable, but she 
survived the injury. Now the supreme 
court had to decide what other limits 
North Carolina law imposed on the use 
of violence to impose a slaveholder’s 
will. Defending the jury verdict, State 
Attorney General Romulus Saunders 
argued that the master/slave relation 
was analogous to other asymmetri-
cal legal relationships — parent/child, 
master/apprentice, and so on — and 
that in every case the law regulated 
the relationship and required that the 
person in authority act reasonably and 
without unnecessary cruelty.40 The 
court, however, concluded that state 
law allowed the slaveholder to use any 
level of violence short of murder, and 
left the task of justifying its decision to 
its newest member, Thomas Ruffin, no 
doubt with the expectation that Ruffin 
would write an opinion sugar-coating 
the harsh result. But for unknown rea-
sons, Ruffin took a different tack. 
Three drafts of his opinion survive. 
The first fits the usual model followed 
by opinions on the law of slavery: It’s 
defensive, apologetic, intended to per-
suade the reader that the holding is a 
just and appropriate balancing of “the 
rights of the owner” with “the general 
protection and comfort of the slave.”41 
Over the next two drafts, however, 
Ruffin systematically stripped away 
most of the self-exculpatory language 
and refashioned the opinion to deny 
any claim that the court was upholding 
something that could be called a right:
[I]t may well be asked, which power 
of the master accords with right? 
The answer will probably sweep 
them all away. But we cannot look 
at the matter in that light. The 
truth is that we are forbidden to 
enter upon a train of general rea-
soning on the subject. We cannot 
allow the right of the master to be 
brought into discussion in courts 
of justice.42
Over 500 years earlier, Chief Justice 
Bereford and his colleagues had begun 
the process of subjecting the power 
relationships of medieval England to 
the power of legal reason. In 1829, Judge 
Ruffin conceded that at the heart of 
republican North Carolina, there was an 
area of social life into which legal rea-
son could not go, within which violence 
was unchecked by law. While the legis-
lature could, by an act of political will, 
modify this reality, Ruffin denied the 
competence of law to do so. “The diffi-
culty is determining where a Court may 
properly begin. . . . The Court, there-
fore, disclaims the power of changing 
the relation in which these parts of our 
people stand to each other.”43
Wait! — did you hear that? These 
parts of our people. In State v. Mann, 
Ruffin resolved the ambiguity in Jay’s 
words, “the African slaves among us,” 
an ambiguity that Tucker and others 
exploited by denying that slaves were 
ever part of the American people or 
entitled to the equal liberty our consti-
tutions seek to protect. Ruffin denied 
himself that easy excuse. Our people: 
The African slaves among us are us, or 
part of us, and Mann’s disavowal of any 
power on the part of the court to pro-
tect those Americans from harm was 
an outright confession that slavery 
rendered American constitutional law 
incoherent, a confession all the more 
sweeping because its constitutional 
dimension was almost invisible.
We’ve now come full circle, from 
the promise of 1292 to the dead end of 
1829. However powerful Ruffin’s mer-
ciless portrayal of slavery, his opinion 
ended on a helpless note: In the face of 
slavery, Marshall’s “great paramount 
law of reason” was powerless.
In a sense, Ruffin was right: As a 
matter of history the constitutional 
self-contradiction of American slav-
ann’s 
disavowal of 
any power on 
the part of the court 
to protect [African 
slaves] from harm 
was an outright 
confession that slavery 
rendered American 
constitutional law 
incoherent.
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ery came to an end (to the extent it did) 
only through political acts of will — 
the Civil War and the Reconstruction 
Amendments. But I want to suggest in 
conclusion that Ruffin was also wrong, 
not just morally wrong in his complicity 
in radical injustice, but wrong in reach-
ing so quickly the conclusion that law 
was helpless in the face of that injus-
tice. One of the most persistent themes 
in the American constitutional law tra-
dition has been our refusal to accept 
too quickly a limit on the problems 
“the artificiall Reason and judgment 
of law” can address. That there are 
such limits is also a theme in the tra-
dition, but, in identifying those limits, I 
believe we should always question any 
assumption, whether comfortable or 
despairing, that constitutional law can-
not address a social wrong. 
Whether we have reached a limit 
on the law’s domain is itself a crit-
ical and often difficult question of 
constitutional law. At times, whatever 
answer we give will fall short of geo-
metric proof, and when that is so, the 
assumptions, the preconceptions, and 
the prejudices we bring to the question 
may determine our answer. We are 
responsible for our assumptions and 
should be mindful of our prejudices. 
The constitutional law tradition may 
and should structure our decisions; it 
cannot relieve us of the burden and the 
privilege of responsible decision. 
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